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POINT I 
LUCKY SEVEN APPEALS FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS 
ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY, 
The Respondent's brief is noteworthy in two respects. 
First, it totally fails to respond to any of the Appellant's 
issues raised on appeal, and second, it lacks any citation to the 
record to support any of its assertions. 
The Respondent's brief appears to be based upon the 
assumption that the lower Court's Summary Judgment is grounded on 
findings of fact. (Respondent's Brief P. 7) Clark, further, 
argues that the trial court's pivotal rulings, or so called 
findings, that the "sole purpose" of the easement was to maintain 
and operate a dike and reservoir, and that other uses of the 
easement were "predicated" on the continued use of the property 
as a dike and reservoir, are supported by the record. 
(Respondent's Brief P. 8) Clark's brief, however, glosses the 
critical fact that Lucky Seven is appealing from a Summary 
Judgment, and not from a judgment entered after trial in which 
the finder-of-fact might have weighed the evidence and entered 
findings. Clark's brief ignores Lucky Seven's argument that 
because the intents and reasons of the parties for granting the 
easement are disputed, these questions could not be properly 
resolved by Summary Judgment. Owen v. W. H. Westerhaus, 224 Kan. 
42, 578 P.2d 1102 (1978). 
Clark alleges that the trial court made certain findings 
which are entitled to an inference of validity. (Respondent's 
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brief, P. 7-8) While Lucky Seven does not dispute that findings 
are entitled to an inference, Lucky Seven urges that the rule is 
inapposite in this case. 
A review of the record shows that no findings entitled 
to an inference of validity were entered. The original lawsuit, 
tried in December, 1984, was resolved by Stipulation. Subse-
quently the Court entered an Order and Judgment. No findings of 
fact were entered. In 1985, Pat Clark filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment alleging conduct inconsistent with the easement and 
alleging an abandonment thereof. (R. 180) Lucky Seven filed an 
Affidavit in opposition to the Motion admitting removal of a dike 
and reservoir, but denying any intent to abandon the easement, or 
that the easement required that the property be used as a dike 
and reservoir. (R. 186-190) The Affidavit also admits the 
removal of a fence, but alleges that the fence was on Lucky 
Seven's property, and denies that the particular fence removed 
was a fence required to be maintained by the Order and 
Judgment. 
* When the lower court ordered Summary Judgment for Clark, 
Lucky Seven requested Findings. While findings are not necessary 
on Summary Judgment (Rule 52, URCP), the trial court had 
previously expressed its intent to enter Summary Judgment, 
therefore, Lucky Seven desired that the Court articulate the 
nature of any ambiguity it had found in the Order and Judgment, 
and also describe what evidence the Court had relied upon to find 
an intent to abandon. (R. 207-209). Lucky Seven urges that these 
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so-called findings are not entitled to presumption of validity 
since the trial court was not procedurely in a position to weigh 
the disputed factual questions on Summary Judgment. 
In 1986, two years after trial, and without the benefit 
of a transcript, the District Court stated that according to his 
recollection, the sole purpose of the easement was to enable 
Lucky Seven to maintain and operate the dike and reservoir for 
the benefit of abutting agricultural property. The statement has 
been characterized as a Finding. The so-called finding is 
disputed by the Affidavits on Summary Judgment. (R. 186-190) 
In his brief Clark attempts to justify trial court's 
ruling that the purpose of the easement was to maintain and oper-
ate the dike and reservoir, claiming that the Court made its 
finding based on its knowledge of the facts and evidence pre-
sented at trial. (Respondent's Brief, P.7) Curiously, however, 
the brief makes no reference to the transcript of the trial to 
support the Courtfs knowledge. Obviously, there is no reference 
to the trial transcript in Clark's brief because there is no 
support in the transcript for such a statement. The trial court 
could not have gotten its "sole purpose" or sole reason idea from 
the transcript, because it does not exist therein. Rather, the 
evidence at trial supports multiple uses and purposes for the 
easement property. At trial, Clark's counsel even attempted to 
minimize the necessity for use of the property for irrigation 
purposes which Respondent now claims was the sole purpose of the 
grant of easement. (R. 127:2-19) 
- 3 -
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- Clark's brief makes the equally unsupported and erron-
eous statement that the 1986 Findings are set forth in the 1984 
Order and Judgment. (Respondent's Brief, P. 7) Again, there is a 
glaring paucity of any citation to the record. The Order and 
Judgment says nothing about the purposes of the easement, nor 
does the Order and Judgment state or imply that the easement was 
granted solely to allow operation of a reservoir and dike as the 
District Court later said in 1986. Rather, multiple purposes and 
uses, including agricultural uses, are specifically authorized. 
On Summary Judgment Clark claimed that Lucky Seven was 
required to continue to operate a dike and reservoir. Lucky 
Seven, for its part, denied this intent, and alleged that many 
alternative uses were intended to be permitted. (R. 186-190) 
Had there been a trial, the Court could have weighed the 
evidence, entered a judgment and made findings. However, Summary 
Judgment should have been denied, since the intentions and under-
standings of the parties were material and disputed. The Court's 
so called "Findings" on the basis of disputed Affidavits, are not 
entitled to any inference of validity. 
POINT II 
IT IS A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT WHETHER LUCKY SEVEN 
REMOVED ANY FENCE REFERRED TO IN THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Paragraph 3 of the Order and Judgment (R. 157} states 
that the Plaintiff, Lucky Seven, had a duty to "maintain the 
fences enclosing the area hereinabove described." Obviously, 
- 4 -
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particular fences were contemplated to be maintained. 
Pat Clark alleges that the fences enclosing the easement 
area have been removed. Clark also alleges that this "fact" is 
uncontroverted. (Respondent's Brief, P.4) 
In his Affidavit in opposition to Summary Judgment Lucky 
Seven's president, Russel Walter, stated: 
13. There are several fences which could be 
interpreted as enclosing the easement 
property. 
14. Two such fences are located on the boun-
dary of Defendant's property. One of 
these fences separates Defendant's pro-
perty and the easement property. 
15. The Plaintiff has removed a third fence, 
which fence was located on the Plaintiff's 
property, and not on the disputed pro-
perty. Said fence is not part of the 
easement. •>• r 
16. The fence removed by the Plaintiff does 
not demark any meaningful boundary or 
control cattle, and has no function or 
use, but presents an obstruction to the 
Plaintiff's use of the property. 
There is no dispute that Lucky Seven removed a fence on 
its own property. However, there is a material factual dispute 
whether the fence removed is one of the fences enclosing the 
easement area to which the Order and Judgment refers. It is 
disputed whether Lucky Seven had an obligation to maintain the 
removed fence. Lucky Seven alleges that the fence removed is on 
Lucky Seven's property, is not one of the fences enclosing the 
easement and served no purpose. Obviously, the Order and 
Judgment does not require maintenance of every fence, but only 
- 5 -
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specific fences enclosing the easement area. The identity of the 
fence removed is in issue and should have been determined by 
trial rather than Summary Judgment. 
< •'•• , " , . ' • : " ' • • . • ' ; C - - . : " - : : - r • ' ..' ' • " 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A PERMANENT OBSTRUCTION 
OF THE EASEMENT WARRANTING THE RULING OF ABANDONMENT. 
There is no dispute that Lucky Seven removed an earthen 
dike on the easement property. Lucky Seven argued in it's brief 
that Lucky Seven's admitted conduct in preparing the easement for 
planting, an agricultural purpose, was consistent with the 
approved uses of the easement. Further, Lucky Seven argued that 
in spite of its admitted removal of the dike, there was no clear 
or unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon the easement. 
Timpanogas-Hiland, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, (Utah 1975). 
Pat Clark's brief fails to address either of these issues. 
Pat Clark argues in his brief that Lucky Seven's removal 
of the reservoir and dike is evidence of an intent to abandon the 
easement. According to Clark, Lucky Seven's conduct permanently 
obstructs the use of the easement and displays an intent to 
destroy the easement. Clark's brief, however, candidly admits 
that it must be "assumed" that removal of the dike and reservoir 
is a permanent obstruction of the easement. (Respondent's Brief, 
P. 10) There is no testimony or evidence in the record that 
removal of the earthen dike or reservoir by Lucky Seven created 
any permanent obstruction to the use of the easement. 
- 6 -
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There is evidence and testimony in the record that the 
configuration of the dike and reservoir had changed over time, 
and that removal or alteration created no permanent impediment. 
Russ Walter testified he had built a smaller dike and pond inside 
the larger major pond areaf and was apparently using the same at 
the time of trial. (RT. 33:18-19; 34:10-15) This smaller pond 
did not utilize the dike which was later removed. Thus, a pond 
for irrigation or other purposes had been, and could in the 
future, be created on the easement property even though the dike 
previously part of the larger pond had been removed to accomodate 
planting. Lucky Seven alleged in its Affidavit in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, that a "reservoir could still be maintained on 
the property, should the Plaintiff so elect to use the 
property. Plaintiff does intend to construct a smaller pond for 
Plaintiff's stock watering purposes on the property at a future 
date." (R. 187, Paragraph 7). There is no evidence that the 
removal or construction of an earthen dike and pond has any 
permanent consequences on the use of the easement. There is 
evidence that the contrary is true. 
The Stipulation of the parties contemplated the 
construction of a pipeline for pressurized irrigation of Lucky 
Seven's abutting agricultural property. (R. 153, % 4). This 
pipeline was to be constructed by and was to belong to Lucky 
Seven, and would not benefit Pat Clark. (R. 180, 11 12) The 
Appellant alleges that Clark was aware and understood that upon 
installation of a pipeline the alternative use of the easement 
- 7 -
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for a dike and reservoir would be eliminated, leaving only 
alternative uses. (R. 187, 1[ 6) This pipeline has been 
contructed. It is located where the larger irrigation pond had 
previously been. The contemplated construction of this pipeline 
further emphasizes the intent of the parties that the easement 
have multiple uses, and underscores the intent of Lucky Seven to 
relocate a pond on the easement as stated in its Affidavit. 
Appellant thus disputes that the removal of the earthen 
dike created any permanent destruction of the purposes of the 
easement, and further alleges that it, in fact, intended to 
create a pond on the easement area. Thus, the Respondent's 
"assumption" that the removal of the dike and reservoir is a 
permanent obstruction is not supported by the record, but is a 
disputed issue of fact which should have been reserved for trial. 
POINT IV 
LUCKY SEVEN'S REMOVAL OF THE DIKE AND RESERVOIR 
IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF AN 
INTENT TO ABANDON THE EASEMENT 
The Respondent's brief alleges that removal of the dike 
and reservoir on the easement property is sufficient evidence to 
find an abandonment. Respondent cites Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 
Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962). The Harmon case is instructive 
and should be closely reviewed. In Harmon the Rasmussens, 
landowners, alleged that Harmons had abandoned a prescriptive 
easement for a ditch over the Rasmussen property. The evidence 
supporting abandonment came from two neighbors who alleged that 
' - 8 -
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they had lived in the area for six years, but had seen no water 
running through the ditch at any time. There was also testimony 
that Harmon had piled dirt in the North branch of the ditch 
around the headgate to prevent the water from being turned into 
the ditch by children removing the headgate board when the water 
was not wanted in the ditch. After reviewing these factsf this 
Court stated that "proof of abandonment of such an easement 
requires action releasing the ownership and the right to use with 
clear and convincing proof of an intentional abandonment. This 
requires that Plaintiff ceased to use this easement to irrigate 
their land with the intention to make no further use of it." Id. 
at 765. See also Brown v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 36 
Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909). 
Lucky Seven urges that there is no clear and convincing 
proof of an intent to abandon the easement and make no further 
use of it. Lucky Seven clearly believed that it had the right to 
use the property for agricultural purposes, including planting, 
which had been been a historical use of the property. (RT. 34:17-
20) Lucky Seven removed an earthen dike and reservoir, which 
configuration had been previously altered and changed (RT. 34:14-
15), and alleged that it intended to later construct another 
smaller pond on the easement property. (R. 186-190) The test 
established by the Harmon Court was whether owner of the easement 
had indicated by its conduct, clear and convincing intention to 
make "no further use" of the easement. There is no evidence in 
this case that Lucky Seven intended to make no further use of the 
- 9 -
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easement. On the contrary, Lucky Seven intended to use the 
easement for agricultural purposes, but further expressed an 
intent in its Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment to 
construct a new pond on the easement property. Neither the 
evidence in the record of the trial or the Affidavits of the 
parties in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment supports 
the allegation that there is any clear or convincing evidence 
that Lucky Seven intended to make no further proper use of the 
easement property. 
POINT V 
TERMINATION OF THE EASEMENT IS EXCESSIVELY HARSH 
AND OPPRESSIVE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
Lucky Seven believes that when viewed^ in light of all 
of the circumstances, the Court's termination of the easement for 
its conduct, even if a breach of the easement agreement exists 
(which it denies), was punative and inappropriate. 
A brief summary of the circumstances that suggest a more 
appropriate resolution is warranted. Lucky Seven reasonably 
believed that the language of the easement allowed an agricul-
tural use in planting. (R. 188, 11 9-10) When this interpretation 
was disuted, Clark sought a judicial interpretation of the ease-
ment. Instead of an interpretation with clarifying or remedial 
orders, the Court entered Summary Judgment. 
There is no evidence that the removal of the earthen 
reservoir created any permanent or serious obstruction that could 
- 10 -
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not have been remedied had the trial Court merely clarified the 
permitted uses of the easement and instructed Lucky Seven accord-
ingly. 
There is no evidence in the record of any damage or 
disadvantage flowing to Pat Clark as a result of Lucky Seven's 
use of the property. The maintenance of the reservoir
 f when 
filled with water, was to irrigate Lucky Seven's land, not Pat 
Clark's land. Pat Clark would not benefit from this use since he 
had no water and did not have the right to store water in the 
reservoir in any event. (R. 188, 11 12) 
Since Clark could not be damaged, there was no reason 
that the trial Court could not have interpreted the easement and 
made remedial orders. A more appropriate solution would have 
been entry of an appropriate order requiring restoration of the 
dike, supported by an Order to Show Cause why an injunction 
should not thereafter be ordered or damages. The entry of an 
order terminating the easement under these circumstances, how-
ever, offends justice and equity and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised by Lukcy Seven's appellate brief have 
two primary thrusts. First that the Consent Order and Judgment 
entered in 1984 expressly permitting alternative uses of the 
easement property does not require that the property be used as a 
reservoir and dike. Secondly, the intents of the parties regard-
ing the use or abandonment of the easement are all disputed by 
- 11 -
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the Affidavits offered on Summary Judgment, thereby making a 
Summary Judgment inappropriate as a matter of law. Respondent 
has not addressed the issues raised by Lucky Seven's brief. 
Clark chooses to ignore the issues raised by Lucky Seven 
as well as the clear language of the Order and Judgment. 
Instead, Clark relies wholly on the unsupported recollections and 
pronouncements of the District Court made two years later. 
The Respondent's argument that removal of the dike and 
reservoir creates a permanent obstruction to the easement is 
founded on unsupported "assumptions" and should be rejected. 
The argument made in the Respondent's brief that 
deference should be given to the lower court's findings would be 
appropriate had this matter gone to trial in 1986. However, 
where Summary Judgment was entered the reverse is true, and all 
inferences and deference should be given to the party against 
whom Motion for Summary Judgment was made. Under all of the 
circumstances and the language of the Consent Order and Judgment, 
termination of the easement is an unfair and excessively harsh 
remedy which should be reversed. 
DATED this /XT^I day of December, 1986. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
<^SC^ ^*Z&~-^ 
~/'Timothy B. ^rt3erson 
Dale R. Chamberlain 
C8-50 
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